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ABSTRACT
AEGIS: VALIDATING EXECUTION BEHAVIOR OF CONTROLLER
APPLICATIONS IN SOFTWARE-DEFINED NETWORKS
by Hitesh M. Padekar
The software-defined network (SDN) controller provides an application programming
interface (API) for network applications and controller modules. Malicious applications
and network attackers can misuse these APIs to cause outbreaks on the controller. The
controller is the heart of the SDN and should be secured from such API misuse scenarios
and network attacks. Most of the prior research in security for SDN controllers focuses
on a defense mechanism for a particular attack scenario that requires changes in the
controller code. This research proposes dynamic access control and a policy enginebased approach for protecting the SDN controller from network attacks and application
bugs, thus defending against the misuse of the controller APIs. The proposed AEGIS
protects controller APIs and defines a set of access, semantic, syntactic and
communication policy rules and a permission set for accessing controller APIs. It utilizes
the traditional API hooking technique to control API usage. We generated various attack
scenarios that included application bugs and network attacks on the Floodlight SDN
controller and showed that applying AEGIS secured the Floodlight controller APIs and
hence protected them from network attacks and application bugs. Finally, we discuss
performance comparison tests of the new AEGIS controller implementation for memory
usage, API execution time and boot-up time and conclude that AEGIS effectively
protects the SDN controller for trustworthy operations.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to Software-Defined Networking (SDN)
Software-defined networking (SDN) is an emerging architecture that provides a
dynamic, manageable, cost-effective and adaptable network. This architecture decouples
the network control and forwarding functions, enabling the network control to become
directly programmable and the underlying infrastructure to be abstracted for applications
and network services. In this environment, a controller acts as the “brain” of the whole
network, whereas the data plane consisting of switches does the forwarding job as
instructed by the controller.
SDN has provisioned networks with improved scalability, faster network application
rollouts and better network management. Current network devices and infrastructure
need to be configured manually, and network control and data planes are tightly coupled.
Due to this legacy, the network is not very scalable, and it is difficult to deploy new
features to the network as control and data planes are tightly coupled. SDN decouples the
control and data plane of the network, keeps the controlling logic at the central point, and
hides the complexity of the underlying network’s physical topologies. This makes the
network more flexible for new applications deployment and easier to manage.

1.1 Features of SDN
Today’s network is complex, manual, low level and error-prone. The network keeps
on changing dynamically as new users and devices need provisioning [1]. Even a
campus network is difficult to manage. The configuration is static and is not integrated
with the network very well. Separate devices are required for performing different
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functions. The configuration and management of the network are decentralized. It is
very difficult for network administrators to manage large networks and deployment of
new services may take days or even months.
SDN provides an easier and more flexible system for network management. The
controller has a centralized view of the overall network [3]. Thus, any change in the
network configuration such as adding or removing of devices can be very easily handled
in SDN. The network administrator does not need to go to each individual device in the
network to modify the configuration. Instead, configuring the changes in the controller
would deploy the modifications on the entire network. An SDN facilitates
communication between the applications and the network. This results in a dynamic
network for a dynamic application [6].
SDN provides various features as compared to legacy systems:
a) Logically centralized system for network management
b) Simpler and less error prone due to changes in the network [2]
c) Logically separate networks can exist on the same physical devices
d) Reduces the need to purchase purposely built networking hardware [3]
e) Provides an abstraction by freeing the applications from underlying low level
complexity [4]
f) Automates the application configuration tasks [4]
g) Rapid innovation through the ability to deliver new network capabilities and
services without configuring individual devices [5]
h) Increased network reliability [5]
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i) More accurate network control

1.2 Working of SDN
The OpenFlow protocol is a foundational element for building SDN solutions. It is a
layer 2 communications protocol which focuses on separating the control path from the
forwarding path in order to allow better traffic management than that available through
the access-control lists maintained by routers and switches. OpenFlow also provides a
standard framework for network component programmability.
The OpenFlow-enabled switches contain flow rule tables which forward the received
packets. When a new packet arrives at the switch, it looks into the flow table for
instructions called flow rules of the action to be performed on the packet. If it does not
find any matching flow rule, the packet is then sent to the controller. The controller
processes the packet and marks the packet with an action like “drop the packet and
similar packets,” “forward the packet and similar packets,” “send it to normal
processing.”
The SDN environment uses a set of application programming interfaces (APIs),
which support the services and applications running on the network [3]. These APIs play
a major role in the controller functionality and provide efficient service orchestration and
automation.
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Fig. 1. Architecture of SDN network operating system

Software-defined networking can be divided into three layered architectures:
network applications, controller platform, and physical and virtual devices. All together
this is called a network operating system (NOS) since this architecture is very similar to a
computer operating system. Figure 1 describes the network operating system’s
architecture. Network applications are at the very top layer and contain applications for
network management, control and monitoring; many more applications could be possible.
The controller platform is the middle layer which acts like an operating system core
kernel and provides the framework for building applications and controls network
devices. It provides a set of APIs to the application layer and implements protocols to
communicate with underlying devices. Physical and virtual devices are at the bottom
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layer, which consists of devices such as switches, routers and virtual entities of the
network.

1.3 SDN Controller
The SDN controller is the main strategic control logic of the network and it plays an
important role inside SDN networks. The SDN controller sends information to the
switches and routers using Southbound APIs and talks to the applications running on top
of it using Northbound APIs. It uses well-known interfaces such as OpenFlow, Netconf,
and Open Virtual Switch Database (OVSDB) for the southbound API’s communication.
Whereas, the OSGi framework and REST are used for the northbound API’s
communication. The SDN controller achieves modularity in the software by providing
interfaces to pluggable modules. Using a plug-in interface new modules can be inserted
into the controller at runtime for performing network tasks.
The controller has core modules which are responsible for functions such as
topology management, device tracking, statistics management, flow rule management
and link discovery. These core modules are accessible to other modules and applications
through provided APIs. These APIs have input parameters and output or return
parameters. If the network and applications are behaving legitimately then these
parameter values are within certain boundary limits and we can predict the values.
During the network attack these values changes substantially.
The aim of developing the SDN controller is to provide a platform for deploying
SDN applications and provide a framework for developing an SDN application. Below
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are the basic requirements for building an SDN controller provided by the OpenDaylight
SDN controller community [10].
1. Flexibility: various applications should be able to run on the controller and use
the common functionality that the controller has provided. That means the
generic APIs should be able to accommodate various applications’ needs.
2. Scale the development process: controller applications and modules can be
dynamically plugged into the controller, hence the architecture should allow them
to be developed independently. This helps in independent development between
teams.
3. Run-time extensibility: the architecture should allow insertion of new
applications, modules, services and protocols at runtime. This is required for no
controller shutdown and to adopt new changes easily.
4. Performance and scale: controller stability for various network loads and
applications is very important. The controller architecture should be scalable
without sacrificing the modularity in design.

1.4 Securing SDN Controller
If the controller has any vulnerabilities in its design and implementation, then the
entire network will be unsecured and can be under control of the attacker. Many
approaches have been proposed for making the controller more secure. FortNOX is an
implementation for the NOX controller and it proposes role-based authorization and
security constraint enforcement for the controller kernel [20]. AvantGuard provides
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protection against data-to-control-plane saturation attacks such as TCP SYN Flood [21].
TopoGuard shows how simple API misuse scenarios and network attacks can lead to
failure of the SDN controller [11]. Rosemary implements a secure network operating
system [13]. However, these approaches are more specific to network attacks and
concentrate on authorization of network usage, application development and conflict
resolution. A few of them have considerable performance overhead and they are not the
right choice for implementing on the SDN controllers in the field.
In this work, we implemented an API protection framework which hooks the
controller APIs at runtime and check the input-output parameters against the set of rules
defined by AEGIS. Each call to the controller API will be monitored by AEGIS at
runtime and checked for syntactic, semantic, access and communication policy rules.
Using this, an API misuse case will be logged and unsolicited requests will be dropped.
We implemented AEGIS on the Floodlight SDN controller and showed the experiment’s
results. As a proof of concept, we generated three attack scenarios and implemented a
policy engine to provide a defense mechanism against these attack scenarios. Our attack
scenarios involved an application bug, a network attack from the network devices and a
protocol vulnerability between an SDN controller and a switch. Also, we studied three
other attack scenario with network attacks and application bugs for which we have
proposed a protection mechanism using our AEGIS policy engine.
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Chapter 2: Motivation with Background
For SDN networks, the controller has been a target for the attackers. DDoS and
SYN Flood are awkward type of attacks that mainly focus on abusing the SDN controller.
Network applications also can make use of controller APIs to generate traffic, perform
malicious activities and make changes in the network topology. Controller applications
with software faults lead to failure in the controller’s functionality. Scenarios in the past
show that unintentionally called controller APIs may lead to serious issues for the
controller such as exhausting resources, bringing down the SDN controller and changing
the controller information.

2.1 Background
Avant-Guard is a data layer implementation which addresses two challenges of the
OpenFlow protocol vulnerability at the SDN controller [7]. First, it proposes that a
communication bottleneck between the control and data plane may lead to a control plane
saturation attack. Solution for this attack is to move the logic for the connection
establishment from the control plane to the data plane, and once the complete connection
is established, then this connection is migrated to the control plane. Second, actuating
triggers are inserted by the control layer on the data layer, and Avant-Guard
asynchronously notifies the control layer if any event triggers configured flow rules in the
data layer. However, this does not address SDN controller layer issues and does not
prevent any attacks by SDN applications.
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Rosemary implements a robust and secure network operating system [13]. The
researchers demonstrated how simple and common failures in the network application
may lead to serious issues on the SDN controller and sometimes complete breakage of
the SDN control plane. They introduced containers for network applications and
implemented a policy engine for the application permission structure. However, they do
not have a provision to dynamically change policies for the application permission and
resource usage.
TopoGuard proposes new attack scenarios based on spoofing attacks such as an ARP
poisoning attack [11]. It showed how poisoning of the network topology will affect the
higher-level controller services. It implemented a man-in-the-middle attack, a hostlocation-hijacking attack and a denial-of-service (DoS) attack. The researchers
introduced real-time detection and an automated solution for the network poisoning
attack and implemented the TopoGuard for the SDN controller. To create one such
attack, they targeted one of the controller APIs which was returning true values in either
case, and did not perform any validation of the request. They successfully implemented
one attack scenario of a host hijacking by abusing this vulnerable controller API.
However, this implementation did not prevent such an API misuse scenario or a method
to detect any such vulnerabilities in the controller code.
The policy engine for the AMI protocol implements a set of rules and prevents
malware from abusing the core APIs [14]. Creating a set of rules and access policies for
the controller APIs will prevent such attacks. We need to monitor the controller APIs’
access at runtime and the policy engine should protect it from being mishandled. This
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engine should be dynamically configurable so that any future requirement to enable or
disable access to the controller APIs can be granted or denied.
Read, notification, write and system access permissions are also defined for the
OpenFlow applications [15]. The controller and apps are isolated in thread containers
and an access control layer is introduced in between the applications and the operating
system (OS). Although this is good idea for providing access policies for applications, it
does not provide a method to dynamically control access for the OpenFlow applications
and provide security against network attacks.
Permissions and policies can be defined for accessing flow rules and other data
structures; however, this does not help to protect the controller from network attacks [12].
Also, prior research mainly focuses on security for the northbound interface and anomaly
detection [16]. This thesis concentrated on the controller core module API’s security and
misuse cases as these are called both from the north-bound as well as south-bound APIs.
The technique is also been proposed by the prior researchers that focuses on
protecting the network flows and presents an access control scheme, based on the
OpenFlow model, for accessing the switches’ flow tables and their entries [17].
However, our study shows that a similar feature is already implemented in the
OpenDaylight controller’s latest release. However, this thesis had proposed an idea to
protect the APIs which operate on flow rules, for example protecting the forwarding rules
manager’s API and defining access policies for these APIs.
OperationCheckpoint presents an approach to secure the northbound interface by
introducing a permission system that ensures that controller operations are available to
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trusted applications only [18]. OperationCheckpoint is an attempt to make north-bound
APIs secure and it defines the permissions for applications for using these APIs.
However; it does not make any attempt to secure the controller core modules from
network attacks.
Most of the prior work to provide security for the SDN controller involves changes
in the controller code. Changing the controller code might be acceptable for some
developers; however, it may not be acceptable for other owners of the code. The added
extra code needs to be tested for all the positive and negative test scenarios, and in some
cases this may lead to an addition of bugs. The prior security solutions are designed on a
case-by-case basis and do not demonstrate a generic approach which can be used for all
scenarios. Defining an access policy for API usage is an important aspect of providing
security for the controller. However, most of the prior designs propose a static approach
that is applicable for a particular scenario and lacks scalability for a generic case. We
discuss each of these aspects in detail in subsequent sections.

2.2 Motivation
We propose a security framework which can be applied to a controller API and has a
generic way to configure the API usage and define a set of policies for the API. We
identified the controller’s important APIs for Floodlight and OpenDaylight SDN
controllers. Then, we define a set of access, static and dynamic policies for these APIs.
We used Spring and AspectJ API hooking techniques to dynamically hook the controller
APIs [26], [27]. The hooked APIs then invoke the policy engine to further apply the
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defined policies for the APIs. We implement the hooked APIs and policy engine on the
Floodlight controller. Our study shows that this architecture can be ported to all the
leading SDN controllers in the market.
Below are the proposed set of requirements that controller security framework should
have.
2.2.1 Dynamic Access Control Framework
The OpenDaylight community currently has more than 20 open source
applications and modules and many propriety applications. Changing the code for each
of these applications may not be feasible and it adds more overhead to each of these
applications. The controller code is very sensitive and any code which is not completely
tested will add a bug in the controller and may lead to serious issues. The approach for
providing dynamic access control should be such that it does not require any changes in
the controller or application code. We implemented a hooking technique which allows
us to hook the controller APIs at runtime and execute our policy engine which provides
access control for applications. Using this approach, the access permission can be
changed at runtime.
2.2.2 No Downtime for the Controller
Most of the access control approaches proposed in the past require applications
and a controller code to be re-compiled before running them all together. Although,
controllers such as OpenDaylight allow applications and controller modules to be loaded
dynamically at runtime, prior approaches needs the controller to go down before adding
an access control framework. Bringing the SDN controller down may be very costly and
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should be avoided. OpenDaylight allows runtime up-gradation of the controller modules
and features. Our implementation address this issue as we need do not to compile
complete the controller code. We need only compile the modules individually and load
them dynamically while the controller is live.
2.2.3 Changing Permission Set for the Controller Data
None of the prior approaches allow changing access policies at runtime; the
policies enforced for an application are static and cannot be configured at runtime. For
example, suppose one application does not have access to flow rules in version 1;
however, the next version of this application may need to access the flow rules
legitimately. To make any changes in access control for these legitimate applications, we
need to make changes in the controller code. In prior approaches, this required the
controller to shut down, make changes in access control and bring it up again. In our
design, we can enable/disable a permission set for this application dynamically and
change access control for any application dynamically without making any application /
controller module to shut down.
2.2.4 Network Attacks prevention
As demonstrated in [11] and [13]; abusing the controller APIs can generate
network attack and application misuse scenarios. We also implement API hooks with
Floodlight which can be used for preventing such misuse of the controller APIs and
hence prevent network attacks.
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To summarize, past approaches for implementing the access control layer were
more static based and less dynamic. We propose a design which allows us to
dynamically control the access policies with no controller shutdown.
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Chapter 3: Goals of the Thesis
Intentional or unintentional malicious behavior of the network application and
network attacks should not cause network breakdown and controller failure. The
controller assumes that the network applications are stable and provides its APIs for
manipulating controller data. However, application layer software issues should not
cause control layer instability. Network attacks should not affect the controller module’s
internal information. The goal of this thesis was to propose and prototype a scalable
mechanism which can be applied to the SDN controller operating system to make it
secure from such attacks. We defined clear access policies and rules for accessing
controller APIs and have a mechanism to change it dynamically. The major goals were
1.

Create scenarios for misusing controller APIs using network applications misuse
and network attacks
a. Make a network attack on the southbound APIs of the SDN controller modules
and show that network attacks can also misuse controller APIs
b. Generate network attacks to manipulate topology information
c. Generate an attack scenario for a network application misusing controller APIs

2.

Design a system to protect controller APIs

3.

Prototype AEGIS which protects controller APIs from such misuse scenarios
a. Apply an API hooking technique to take over the controller APIs and run policy
engine to validate API usage

4.

Define static and dynamic policies for the information maintained by the controller
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a. Identify invariant and variant information of the controller and define policies to
maintain the integrity of this information
b. Detect if there are any information usage violations on the controller
5.

Invoke a policy engine for monitoring controller API usage
a. Identify rules which are applicable for the controller API and invoke
corresponding policy rules validation upon controller pre and/or post API call

6.

Make the policies configurable at runtime so that the network administrator has full
control of these policies
a. The network administrator should have control of these policies and they should
be dynamically configurable and controlled by the administrator

In this work, we implemented an API protection framework which hooks the
controller APIs at runtime and checks the input-output parameters against the set of rules
defined by AEGIS. Each call to the controller API was monitored by AEGIS at runtime
and checked for syntactic, semantic, access policy and communication policy rules. Each
API misuse case was logged and unsolicited requests were dropped. We have
implemented AEGIS on the Floodlight controller. We have also protected access to
important controller data structures such as flow tables, statistics information and
network configuration information.
The policy engine for AMI protocol implements a set of rules and prevents malware
from abusing the core APIs [14]. Creating a set of rules and access policies for the
controller APIs will prevent such attacks. We need to monitor the controller API’s
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access at runtime and the policy engine should protect it from being mishandled. This
engine should be dynamically configurable so that any future requirement to enable or
disable access to the controller APIs can be granted or denied.
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Chapter 4: Threat Model and Case Studies
Most of the open source controllers contain a set of core modules which define the
controller’s major functionality. The proposed attack model targets these core modules
and causes an outbreak on these controller core modules. We targeted the attack
scenarios defined in the prior research and created similar attack scenarios for the
Floodlight controller. With the help of AEGIS implementation we demonstrated that
such attacks can be prevented. We identified that topology manager, device manager,
statistic manager, host tracker and switch manager are the core controller modules.
Below is the list of attacks we developed for misusing these controller APIs. This
includes implementation of a defense mechanism using AEGIS policy engine.

4.1 Application Misuse Scenarios
The applications invoke controller APIs with input arguments to the API, and in
return, the applications receive the result of the operation in the form of the output value
of the API. Application misuse scenarios involve network applications inadvertently
calling the controller APIs, thus resulting in the controller breakdown, as discussed
below.
4.1.1 Crashing the SDN Controller
In this scenario of attack, the controller application or module calls the
System.exit() function inadvertently to suddenly exit the controller. Such an attack has
been implemented on Floodlight and other controllers [13]. This experiment’s results
show that the controller shuts down completely and applying AEGIS policy engine for
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the System.exit() function on the Floodlight controller prevents such an API misuse
scenario. AEGIS implements an access permission for calling the System.exit() API, and
inside the hook for this API it checks for the access permission.
4.1.2 Poisoning Internal Data of the Controller
In this attack scenario, the vulnerable application is changing the controller’s
internal information, such as the network link information. We identified the controller
APIs which were being misused in this attack scenario. We proposed an access policy
and syntactic policy rule for the addOrUpdateLink() and deleteLinks() APIs of the
Floodlight’s link discovery module.
4.1.3 Robustness Test for the Controller
In this case study, the controller application is introducing memory leakage which
is causing the controller to crash with an out-of-memory error [13]. The controller does
not limit the memory used by the application and hence the controller eventually runs out
of memory. In this attack scenario, the controller APIs which are responsible for
allocating resources for the controller modules are getting misused. This model proposes
an approach to handle such scenarios with the help of AEGIS implementation.

4.2 Network Topology Attacks
This threat model covers three network topology attack scenarios.
4.2.1 Denial-of-Service Attack
In this attack scenario we implemented a TCP SYN Flood attack and port scan
attack on the Floodlight controller. The attacker scans Ports 1 through 1024 of the victim
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machine. It then continuously sends TCP SYN packets to the victim machine on the
open ports such as Port 22 and Port 80, so as to utilize all the resources of the victim
machine, thus crippling the victim machine and preventing it from actually being able to
reply to any kind of valid traffic that it would receive.
The Floodlight controllers forwarding module is responsible for making the packet
forwarding decisions such as FORWARD_OR_FLOOD, FORWARD, MULTICAST,
DROP or taking no action. The forwarding module’s createMatchFromPacket API
constructs a specific match based on the deserialized OFPacketIn payload. It uses the
source MAC address, destination MAC address, and other IP and TCP header fields to
create a match for the received packet. However, it does not take into consideration the
switch inPort or the TCP packet type while making a decision. Hence, the spoofed TCP
SYN messages match the existing flow rules and forward them to the target host. This
study proposes semantic, syntactic and communication policies for the
createMatchFromPacket API using AEGIS policy engine implementation.
4.2.2 Backdoor Attack
The attack was implemented using the fundamentals of ARP spoofing. The main
assumption that was made while implementing this attack was that the attacker was
aware of the IP address of the intended victim and compromised host in the local
environment. The attacker uses a gratuitous ARP request to probe the compromised
host’s MAC address. Then, it generates the spoofed ICMP messages towards the
compromised host and uses victim’s host machine as a destination.
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The Floodlight controller’s device manager module creates device entities database
entries based upon MAC addresses seen in the network and tracks network addresses
mapped to the device and their location within the network. The device manager’s
getSourceEntityFromPacket method retrieves device entity information from the packet.
Based on this, the learnDeviceByEntity method does a lookup in the device entity
database of the device manager module. The lookup is based on the device key which is
created using the host’s MAC address. However, for the spoofed ICMP requests with the
wrong MAC address, this lookup matches an existing entity. The implemented AEGIS
policies protect this API and show the results, wherein they also check for the host’s
attachment point on the switch port to perform a lookup for the device entity.
4.2.3 Host Location Hijacking Attack
In this attack scenario, an adversary exploits the host tracking Service in the
OpenFlow network [11]. The attacker host makes use of an unimplemented method of
the controller to generate this attack scenario. The adversary tampers with the host
location information of the controller to break the security and impersonate the target
host. In this attack scenario, all traffic for the web server running on the target host is
routed to the attacker host.
This study found that the attacker makes use of unimplemented methods of the
Floodlight controller which return a positive result in either case and does not perform
any validation checks. The isEntityAllowed is one such unimplemented API which is
being misused in this attack scenario. Inside AEGIS hook for this API, we implemented
a security module which detects the host migration scenario and prevents unimplemented
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API’s misuse. Table I summarizes our threat model and lists the controller APIs which
are being misused for these attack scenarios.

TABLE I. Threat model and misused controller APIs
#
1
2
3

Attack
Crashing SDN
controller
Abusing
controller’s
security
Robustness test for
the controller

4

Denial-of-Service
attack

5

Backdoor attack

6

Host location
hijacking attack

Module

Floodlight APIs

OpenDaylight APIs

System

Exit

Exit

Link discovery
manager

rowsDeleted

rowsDeleted

Memory

new

new

processPacketIn
Message
Forwarding
createMatchFro
mPacket
learnDeviceByE
Device manager
ntity
isEntityAllowed
Host tracking
switchPortChang
service
ed
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processPacketInMess
age
getSourceEntityFrom
Packet
isEntityAllowed

Chapter 5: Implementation of Network and Application Attacks
We developed a prototype system based on our design to secure the controller APIs
from application bugs and network attacks. This implementation has one network
application attack scenario which is based on the Rosemary [9] test for an applicationcalling exit API to bring the controller down and a network attack scenario which is
based on TopoGard [16] experiments for poisoning an SDN network. We also proposed
a new network attack scenario, a backdoor attack, which is based on an ARP cache
poisoning attack. We used the Floodlight controller for our experiments. We then
identified a set of controller APIs which are causing these attacks. We defined policies
for these APIs and showed that applying these policies has saved the controller from
getting misused by these network attacks and application bugs.

5.1 Experimental Environment for Application Bug
To test the controller’s stability and security against application bugs, and an API
misuse scenario, we have set up the test environment as shown in Figure 2. This setup is
similar to the Rosemary’s test setup for testing the controller’s robustness [13]. We
chose the Floodlight controller as our main target; however, as described in the Rosemary
paper [13], such attack scenarios are also possible with the OpenDaylight and other
leading open source controllers. Our aim is to create a similar attack scenario using the
Floodlight controller and prevent these attacks with the help of our AEGIS
implementation. We set up the SDN controller connected to the OpenFlow switch and
two hosts, H1 and H2. Here, we run the controller with a modified application to test the

33

robustness and security. The modified applications are misusing the controller APIs to
create an outbreak.

Fig. 2. Evaluation environment for network application bug

Following are the steps that we need to perform to run the Floodlight SDN controller
with AEGIS implementation:
1.

Update Java libraries.

2.

Install Spring tool [26] for building and running the Floodlight controller code.

3.

Download and build the Floodlight controller.

4.

Set up the Spring target to execute the controller.
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5.2 Crashing SDN Controller
To demonstrate that an application bug or improperly called controller API may
cause SDN controller instability, we modified the existing application of the controller.
We used the Rosemary’s [10] testing Floodlight controller robustness test case, in which
the controller program exits suddenly. In this example the developer inadvertently calls
the system exit or return function. We modified the topology manager code to
inadvertently call the System.exit() API. We then ran the controller and connected the
OpenFlow switch with the controller and two hosts. When the hosts are inserted into this
SDN network, the controller’s topology manager module calls the updateTopology() API
and performs certain actions for this topology update, and eventually calls the
System.exit() API. In this case, the controller stops working as soon as the topology
manager calls the System.exit() API. We then replaced this controller with the Floodlight
controller that has an AEGIS implementation. We defined the access policies for calling
the System.exit() API. In this case, except for the controller’s main module, no other
module is allowed to call the System.exit() API. The results show that although the
topology manager tries to execute the exit function, since it does not have access policy
defined by AEGIS, it won’t be able to execute it and the controller continues to run
normally without shutting down. Figure 3 shows that the topology manager is calling the
System.Exit() API after updating the topology and Figure 4 shows that the controller
shutdowns after that.
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Fig. 3. Topology manager calling System.exit() API at updateTopology event

Fig. 4. Floodlight controller exiting due to System.exit() API call

5.3 Case Study: Poisoning Internal Data of the Controller
The controller maintains various types of network information with its execution
instance. Applications can call controller APIs to manipulate this internal information.
Such unauthorized access may lead to effective loss of the network. A study by
Rosemary [13] shows that the network link information can be modified or deleted using
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a simple test application. Thus, a simple rough application can easily confuse other
important network applications.
In this attack scenario, the vulnerable application is changing the controller’s internal
information such as the network link information. To protect the controller’s internal
data, it is essential to have a permission set for each of the applications. For example, a
test application should not have write or modify operation permission for the network
link information of the controller, and corresponding controller APIs for performing
modify or delete operations. We identified the controller APIs which were being misused
in this attack scenario. We proposed a permission set, access policy rule and syntactic
policy rule for the addOrUpdateLink() and deleteLinks() APIs of the Floodlight’s link
discovery module.

5.4 Case Study: Resource Leak for the Controller
The resource leak could be of multiple types: application allocating memory,
network attacks utilizing controller resources, and bugs existing in the controller internal
module. The memory used by the controller is an important performance factor. A
syntactic policy defines validation for the input parameter, and a communication policy
defines validation for the amount of memory requested and the number of times this API
is called, implementing these will resolve this issue. In the robustness experiment with
the Rosemary [13], researchers have created a linked list without bounds checking and
the controller eventually runs out of memory. Creating a communication policy for a list
creation API and validating a syntactic policy will resolve this issue.
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Fig. 5. Network setup for implementing network attacks

5.5 Experimental Environment for Network Attack Generation
The experimental lab setup consists of 3 hosts as shown in Figure 5. One of the hosts
is set up as the Floodlight controller while another host is configured as an Open vSwitch.
Attacker, victim and compromised host machines are connected to the Open vSwitch to
simulate a LAN environment. Figure 5 shows the detailed network setup.
The next component of the setup is the Open vSwitch instance. Open vSwitch
connects the SDN controller using OpenFlow protocol and it is capable of running on a
linux-based environment. The machine on which the switch is installed was fitted with
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the additional virtual interfaces so that it could support connections to multiple hosts to
emulate a physical switch based on the OpenFlow protocol.
Next we went on with the installation of required additional software on each of the
hosts, the controller and the switch. We installed monitoring tools like Wireshark to
accompany the TCPDump utility for the packet analysis once they had been captured on
the respective machines. Also to emulate the flow of traffic, we used a packet generator
called PackETH and Scapy tool [24], [25]. With these utilities, we were able to simulate
various kinds of traffic requests from one machine to another. The scripts were written in
python, using Scapy library, to perform the attacks and run on a host in the network.

5.6 Case Study: Denial-of-Service Attack
In this attack, the experimental topology uses two hosts. The port-scan attack was
initiated from the attacker’s host to attack the victim’s host. The script scans Ports 1
through 1024 of the Victim host. The traffic is captured on the interfaces of the switch
and the hosts and the timestamps are used for the analysis. The attack was implemented
using the Scapy utility [25]. Then the denial-of-service attack was generated by having
the attacker machine send a continuous stream of SYN packets to the victim machine on
Port 22 and Port 80 so as to utilize all the resources of the victim machine, thus crippling
the victim machine from actually being able to reply to any kind of valid traffic that it
would receive. TCPDump was run on both the hosts and each of the interfaces of the
switch to capture the traffic flowing through the network. We used this captured traffic
to do further analysis of the network.
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5.7 Implementing a Backdoor Attack
The controller was set up and the Open vSwitch was configured to communicate
with the controller on the dedicated Port 6653 on which the controller listens for
incoming connections from the switch. An Open vSwitch bridge was created with a port
to communicate with the controller and had additional ports for establishing connections
with the hosts in the network. Once the bridge was established, we mapped the virtual
bridge ports to the actual ports of the machine and installed routes indicating the interface
to be used for each host connected to the switch for the proper functioning of the
experimental topology. We issued ping requests from the machines to each other to see
the flows that were being pushed by the controller onto the switch to enable
communication between the hosts present in the network. It was noted that the first ping
would take about 3 times longer to reach the destination as compared to rest of the pings.
This was the expected response, as the first packet is always sent to the controller for the
pushing of the control flow so that the next packets that would arrive for that particular
destination would be directly forwarded according to the pre-installed flows in the switch
by the controller. Also for every new combination of the source and the destination
address, a new flow would be installed in the switch for further communication between
the end points. As shown in the Figure 6, the Floodlight controller identifies three hosts
in the network.
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Fig. 6. Floodlight web interface showing hosts connected to the switch

5.8 Generating a Back Door Attack
The attack was implemented using the fundamentals of ARP spoofing. The main
assumption that was made while implementing this attack was that the attacker was
aware of the IP address of the intended victim and the compromised host in the local
environment. We used the PackETH utility to create gratuitous ARP request packets for
the compromised host from the attacker. Once the compromised host would reply to the
ARP request, the attacker would receive the MAC address of the compromised host.
Figure 7 shows the flow of a gratuitous ARP request and a reply.
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Fig. 7. Flow of a gratuitous ARP request and reply

Fig. 8. Gratuitous ARP request
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Fig. 9. Gratuitous ARP reply
Figure 8 and 9 shows ARP packets received on the attacker’s host. Using this
information along with the help of the PackETH utility, we sent a fixed number of
packets to the victim machine from the attacker using the spoofed information of the
compromised host. By using the Wireshark tool, we confirmed that the victim machine
was receiving the ICMP packets and the compromised host was receiving the response to
these pings from the victim machine. On the switch, only the flow rule for gratuitous
ARP was registered. No other flow rule was being pushed on the switch from the
controller.
So the attacker was flying under the radar with this attack as no flow rules from the
attacker machine towards the intended victim was pushed on the switch by the controller.
This proved that the detection of the attacker was difficult in this condition. Figure 10
shows the backdoor attack using ICMP Ping.
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Fig. 10. Attack using ICMP ping

5.9 Implementing Host Location Hijacking Attack
In this attack scenario, the attacker spoofs the network to exploit the Host Tracking
Service (HTS) of the OpenFlow Network. HTS maintains a host profile for each of the
hosts to track the network mobility and it monitors packet-in messages to detect the
motion of the hosts. However, due to lack of authentication and unimplemented empty
API of the controller’s device manager module, attacker was able to sniff the network
traffic of another host. A similar attack scenario is implemented by the TopoGuard that
exploits the isEntityAllowed API of the Floodlight controller [11]. This API accepts
every update instead of blocking possible spoofing attacks. Such security is easy to break
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by impersonating the target host. All OpenFlow controllers use HTS service to make the
packet forwarding decision. This is the main reason that adversary can hijack any host in
the network.

Fig. 11. Attacker impersonates a web server to phish user
The attacker generates packets with the same identifier as the target web server. The
controller believes that the target host has been moved to a new location and it updates
the host profile for this host. The new traffic for the genuine host will be forwarded to
the attacker’s host. The web clients harvesting attack is a practical example of exploiting
the HTS [11].
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(a) Connected to genuine server

(b) Connected to attackers server

Fig. 12. Web clients harvesting attack

In the experimental setup shown in the Figure 11, we have an OpenFlow network
with the Floodlight controller which has HTS service. We deployed a web server with
the IP address “11.0.0.8” and the attacker host is present in the same network. An
attacker host also runs a web server. Before the attack, the web client is able to reach the
genuine server at a designated IP address and a port, as shown in Figure 12 (a). Then, the
attacker sends an ARP request to probe the MAC address of the “11.0.0.8” host. We then
used the PackETH utility to generate fake packets using this MAC address and IP address
“11.0.0.8” [24]. After that, we see all new requests by the web client going to the
attacker’s web server, as shown in the Figure 12 (b).
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Chapter 6: Overview of AEGIS
To protect the controller APIs and avoid any misuse, we implemented AEGIS. The
main principle behind AEGIS is to validate the controller API’s access and protect it
from being misused. AEGIS will be executed before the actual API and it identifies a set
of policies and rules which are applicable for this API. Then, AEGIS invokes the policy
engine to validate policies and rules. If all the validations are successful, then AEGIS
returns control to the actual controller API and continues execution. AEGIS invocation is
also possible at the post execution of the controller API. At this point, we can validate
for returned information by the controller. This allows validation of both request and
response information of the controller API.
Hooking is a technique used to alter the behavior of the software program. It can be
used for intercepting the function call and events. The code which does this is called a
“hook.” This technique is used for debugging the code, intercepting the system call, and
sometimes for doing malicious activities such as implementing a rootkit. A hook can be
inserted at runtime or while creating executables of the software.
An API hooking is a technique by which we can modify the flow of API calls. We
proposed an AEGIS which is based on the API hooking technique. Here we can gain
control over the controller APIs, validate the parameters passed to the API, and perform
policy checking. Figure 13 shows the high level system architecture for AEGIS.
AEGIS can be divided into three parts:
6.1 Hooked API

47

These are the software hooks and the point of entry to AEGIS system that are used
for extending controller APIs’ functionality. Hooked APIs are invoked at runtime
whenever a controller API that is protected by AEGIS is called. Hooked APIs can be
executed prior and after call to the controller API. When executed prior to the controller
API, they validates the arguments passed and invokes the policy engine. If executed after
the controller API, they validates return values and invokes the policy engine if required.
Hooked APIs can also be used to completely overtake the controller API; that means,
instead of executing a controller API, we can only execute the hook and return
parameters.

6.2 Policy Engine
The policy engine identifies the set of rules that need to be validated for a particular
controller API. It also finds the policy rule from the policy rule database and performs
validation of the API parameters. It validates the API parameters for static, syntactic,
access, and communication policy rules.

6.3 Policy Rule database
This database contains controller APIs and a set of policies applicable to those APIs.
API policies are maintained in the hash table where a name of the controller API is the
key to the hash function. The hash value contains API parameters and a set of policies
for those parameters.
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When network applications request access to the controller APIs, they first hits the
controller’s hooked API. The hooked API triggers AEGIS and policy engine. After
returning from AEGIS a call to the controller API may be executed. Similarly, when
interface plug-ins try to access controller APIs, they first land at the controller APIs and
invoke AEGIS. The policy engine communicates with the policy rules database and
retrieves information for APIs and parameters. Figure 13 shows a high level overview of
AEGIS implementation.

Fig. 13. High level overview of AEGIS
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Chapter 7: AEGIS System Design
We implemented AEGIS for the Floodlight controller using the Java API hooking
technique and an AspectJ language. For the current implementation, we chose the
statistics manager, topology manager and the host tracker module of the Floodlight
controller. The policy engine is a new module in the Floodlight controller written in Java
and AspectJ. The hooked APIs check each of the input-output parameters against the set
of policy rules. Although our current implementation is specific to the Floodlight
controller, this design can be adapted to other controllers. Figure 14 shows the complete
architecture of AEGIS implementation.
AEGIS policy engine defines a set of policy functions for validating policies for API
access. Hooked controller APIs trigger the policy engine to validate API usage. The
policy engine gathers the controller’s invariants such as controller configuration, the list
of registered modules, etc. from the policy rules database. Also, AEGIS defines
syntactic, semantic, and access policy rules for module communication.
The policy engine performs four different types of policy rules [14] validations:
1. Access policy rules: these are for controlling the API’s access by modules and
applications. This rule defines which module or application has access to which
API of the controller.
2. Syntactic policy rules: these are for verifying static and invariant data such as
protocol ID, and system configuration data passed to the controller API.
3. Semantic policy rules: these are applied to dynamic data objects and they define
the range of values for a data object.
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4. Communications policy rules: these rules describe the sequence of operation for
the communications between two modules.

Firewall
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Router

Other App

Policy engine

Northbound interface

Policy Executor
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Semantic policy
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Invoke Policy
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Access policy

Controller core
modules

Policy interpreter
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Policy
database

Southbound interface

Switch

N/w device

Router

Fig. 14. AEGIS system architecture

7.1 Policy Rules Database
A policy rules database is maintained by AEGIS which contains controller APIs and
corresponding access permissions and invariant variables. It is maintained in a hash table
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and uses an API name as the key to fetch entries from the hash table. The policy engine
retrieves access policies from the database and applies policy rules to the API parameter.

7.2 Policy Interpreter
The policy interpreter reads the policies from the policy database and loads them
into the controller memory. These policies are used by the policy executor for executing
each of the policies inside the API hook. Policy interpreter also fetches permission sets
for the applications and loads them into the controller memory, and monitors the policy
database for any further changes.

7.3 Policy Rules
Policy rules are the validation procedures for API execution and are divided into four
categories [14]:
7.3.1 Access Policy Rules
Access policies are defined by doing a static analysis of the controller code and
identifying which application or module has access to which API of the controller. We
identified the important APIs of the core modules and the legitimate modules and
applications which can access those APIs. This is done with tools such as Eclipse to
identify the caller of the controller APIs. AEGIS maintains the “permission.csv” file and
writes access policies for each API and modules in this file. AEGIS reads this file at the
controller startup and store it in a policy database. Inside the API hook, AEGIS dumps
the call stack at runtime and identifies which module is calling the controller API. It then
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looks up the policy database to identify a permission set for this API. If the permission
set for the calling module contain a valid value such as read or write, then AEGIS checks
the further policies. If the access policy is not set, no further execution of this API is
required and the API hook returns a failure response. Any changes to the access
permission can be taken care of dynamically by AEGIS. For example, if there are any
changes in the “permission.csv” file, AEGIS updates the policy database and any further
access for this API will be handled accordingly.
7.3.2 Syntactic Policy Rules
Syntactic policies define the use of the invariant data for the parameters. An
invariant is a property that holds at a certain point or points in a program; these are often
seen in assert statements, documentation, and formal specifications [19]. The current
implementation of AEGIS involves study of the controller code to identify the invariants.
However, AEGIS implementation can be enhanced to use a static analysis tool to identify
the invariants in the controller code and keep this invariant information inside the policy
database. To do this, the Daikon invariant detector can be used to identify the controller
invariants [19]. The controller can be executed inside the Daikon environment for the
first time and generated invariants can be collected into the policy database. Hooked
APIs and policy engine do validate the invariants passed to the controller APIs against
the values from the policy database. Any malicious values will be detected and access to
the controller API will be blocked.
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7.3.3 Semantic Policy Rules
Semantic policies are defined for the dynamic data which are changing within the
range. IP address, port and configuration data are examples of dynamic data. We
identified the dynamic data for the important controller APIs and performed validation
checking for each of these dynamic data. Although this is a manual effort, it is useful for
identifying the malicious values passed to the API. This policy implementation needs
complete understanding of the controller code and data range values. However, module
implementers will be able to identify the exact range of the values passed to the API.
7.3.4 Communication Policy Rules
Communication policies define the flow of execution of requests. These policies
identifies the state of the protocol while communicating between two modules. For
example, the host should not move to different switch ports without proper termination of
the current port. These policies will detect any such violations in communication
between two modules or interfaces. Hooked APIs will maintain the state of the
communication for verification.

7.4 Permission Set
Applications and controller modules have a set of read, write and delete permissions
for accessing controller modules, APIs and internal data. For example, the topology
monitoring application can only read the link information and network statistics
information from the controller and should not be performing any write or modify
operation on the controller’s statistics information. For each of the controller
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applications, a permission set will be defined for all the modules to which it has access.
Table II shows a sample permission set for the Floodlight controller applications. For
example, the circuit pusher application has direct access to the static flow pusher module
of the Floodlight controller and can perform read, write and delete operations on flow
rules. However, it does not have access to any other controller module APIs. Also, the
access control list (ACL) application can perform a read operation for statistics module.
That means the ACL application can call the “get” APIs of the statistics module;
however, it is not allowed to call “put” or “delete” APIs.

TABLE II. Permission set for Floodlight controller applications
Application
Virtual
Switch [22]

Allowed
Modules
Statistics

Permission
Set
Read

Flow Rule

Read, Write,
Delete
Read,
Write,
Delete
Read, Write,
Delete
Read

Circuit
Pusher [23]

Flow Rule

ACL
(stateless
FW) [24]

Flow Rules
Statistics

Description
Is a network virtualization application
used for creation of multiple logical
layer 2 networks.
Based on IP address and priority, it
creates a bidirectional circuit.
Applies ACL rules (Access Control
List) for the OpenFlow switches using
flow rules and by monitoring ingress
traffic.

Appendix A contains a complete list of the OpenDaylight controller applications and
a permission set for them.
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7.5 Algorithm for Executing AEGIS
The policy engine is invoked by the API hook and it first checks any defined policies
for this API and executes policies inside the API hook. The algorithm for execution of
the API hook is as shown below.
Step 1: Before executing the actual API, invoke the API hook.
Step 2: Inside the hook, validate the permission set for this API access and if it is
valid then extract the input parameters.
Step 3: Check if access policy is set for this API; if yes, then go to step 4, or else go
to step 5.
Step 4: Retrieve allowed modules for this API and check if the caller of this API is in
the list of allowed modules. If the caller is not in the list of allowed modules,
then do not execute this API and go to step 9, or else go to step 5.
Step 5: If semantic policy is defined for this API, then execute the policy engine code
for this API which do validate the input parameters, or else go to step 6.
Step 6: If syntactic policy is defined for this API, then execute the policy engine code
for this API which do validate the input parameters for syntactic policy, or
else go to step 7.
Step 7: If communication policy is defined for this API, then execute the policy
engine code for this API, which does validate of the communication
parameters, or else go to step 8.
Step 8: Proceed with the execution of the API.
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Step 9: If the exit policy is defined for the API, then validate the return/output
parameter of the API. If required, change the output parameter value.
Step 10: Exit from the hook.
Appendix B contains pseudo code for the implementation of AEGIS and Figure 15
shows AEGIS execution flow chart.

7.6 Policy Language
Our policy language defines several basic components as shown in the Table III. A
policy for the API can be written as,
, T, I,
For example, the policy for the System.exit() API,
, write, null,
states that, an access policy A is defined for the System.exit() API and the main
module is the only allowed caller of this API which has the write permission for this API
access. There are no (null) input or output parameters that are validated for this API.
Using such a definition, users of the controller can define new policies for the APIs
and apply them using AEGIS. However, the validation checks are feasible and left up to
the implementation of the particular API for better flexibility of design.
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TABLE III. Policy language
Language
X :: = {x1, x2, … } for
all x(i) controller
API’s
P = { A, S, Y, C, E }
A = { m1, m2, … }
S ::= { I, V }
Y ::= { I, V }
C ::= { I, V }
E ::= { R, V }
V = { v1, v2, … }

T ::= { read, write, delete
}
I = { a1, a2, … }
R ::= r
policy :: =
, T, I,

Description
X is a set of all controller APIs for which we are defining
policies.
P is a set of policies that are applicable for this API
A is an access policy that defines a list of allowed modules/
callers m1, m2, … for this API access
S is a semantic policy which defines validation checks for
dynamic input arguments I
Y is a syntactic policy which defines validation checks for
invariants input arguments I
C is a communication policy which defines sequence of
validation checks on input arguments I
E is an exit policy for the API and defines a set of validation
checks V on output parameters R
V is an set of validation checks v1, v2, … for the input
parameters I of the API. Each of these operations is API
implementation specific and should be defined based on each
API. For the flexibility of implementation, our policy
language does not restrict validation checks
T is a permission set which can be a set of read, write, or
delete defined for the caller of this API
I is list of input arguments a1, a2, … for this API
R is return value/parameter r of the API
A policy defines a set of policies P applicable for the API X
and its input parameters I, output parameters R, and a
permission set T is defined for the caller of this API
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Fig. 15. Execution of AEGIS
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NO

Chapter 8: Implementation of AEGIS
AEGIS is based on the fact that during the network attacks, or when any application
tries to misuse the controller APIs, the API input/output parameters or the API execution
flow are more abnormal than the usual. AEGIS implementation involves four steps; the
first step is to identify the important APIs of the controller. The second step is to analyze
the input and output parameters of these APIs. The third step is to define the policies for
the input and output parameters and API's flow of execution. The fourth step is to write a
hook for the controller API which triggers at runtime and invokes the policy engine to
verify the policies. We will discuss each of these steps in detail.

8.1 Identifying the Important APIs
The important APIs of the controller are the ones which make changes on the
controller’s data structure. These include mostly the APIs which do write, update and
modify operations. Get or read operations are not very serious as they only make the
controller information available to other modules or applications. Apart from these,
critical system APIs are also important, such as Exit() for terminating the controller’s
execution and new() for allocating the memory.
Network attacks and applications will try to misuse these APIs to generate an attack
scenario. For example, when the topology manager tries to call the Exit() API, it is an
abnormal flow of the execution for the Exit() API. The normal flow of the execution is
through the main module of the controller. When a network attack such as a backdoor
attack occurs, the attacker tries to make use of the existing flow rules on the controller to
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bypass the security verification. Wrong values for the input switch port and source MAC
address are pass to the controller APIs such as isEntityAllowed() and
handlePacketInEvent(). These attacks are able to bypass security because such
verifications are not implemented for these controller APIs and hence, we see these APIs
being misused. Our first step towards implementation is to identify such important
controller APIs. Also, the open source community does not implement a few APIs. They
simply return default results irrespective of the inputs. They leave the implementation to
the developers who are using those APIs. If deployed in the field as they are, attackers
can use these APIs to generate an attack scenario. We also identified such
unimplemented APIs. Our test results and prior research work shows that the various
attack scenarios are possible using these APIs.

8.2 Classifying Input and Output Parameters into Variants and Invariants
Input parameters given to the function are within a certain range in the case of a
legitimate calls, whereas the API misuse will try to give invalid inputs. Classifying input
and output parameters into invariants and variants is an important step. Syntactic policies
are defined for the static or the invariant parameters of the API, whereas semantic
policies are defined for the variant or the dynamic parameters of the API. Classifying the
parameters step involves manual inspection of the important APIs' input and output
parameters and defining policies for these APIs. Also, the APIs could be classified with
the help of a tool such as Daikon [19] to generate variants and invariants of the program.
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8.3 Defining Policies
Defining a policy means to identify which set of rules should be applied to protect
each of these identified APIs. The decision to choose the policy is based on the analysis
of the API, such as the access policy which is required to protect the API from getting
inadvertently called by the modules other than a legitimate one. For example, the Exit()
API should be called by the Main module and not by any other controller module. A
syntactic policy should be chosen if API input parameters are invariants, while a semantic
policy should be chosen for the dynamically changing parameters. For example, the
static information such as an IP address, a port number and a switch interface number are
the parameters which can be put under the syntactic policy. The dynamically changing
address range and flow entry can be kept under the semantic policy. The communication
policies are used to verify if any of the parameter is not violating the execution of the
flow of the protocol. For example, if any of the network link is migrating from one
switch port to the other switch port without proper shutdown of the link, this is
considered as a violation of the communication policy. APIs which handle link-level
information, flow rules, and host tracking come under the communication policy.

8.4 Applying Policies
Applying the policies involves inserting the defined policies into a policy database,
which is a simple .csv file that stores the policies. These policies are read at runtime and
executed inside the API hook. We implemented a generic hook which is executed for all
the controller APIs for that module. For example, we implemented an API hook for the
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device manager module which is executed for each of the APIs inside the device manager
module. If we have defined a policy for the current API that is being executed inside the
hook, then corresponding policy is executed, or else it continues the execution of the next
API hook.

8.5 Securing the Unimplemented Controller APIs
The open source community develops products which can be used by the majority of
vendors and developers. Their intention is to collaborate on the functionality of the
controller and bring the product into the market quickly. Many of these open source
controllers are developed for academic purposes and later improved for industrial
requirements. Many of the open source controllers do not implement a code which is
vendor-implementation-dependent. For example, topology management is not included
in any of the OpenFlow specifications [8]. Some part of the code is left for the individual
vendors to implement according to their own network requirements. However, due to the
lack of proper documentation by the open source community and individual developers'
incomplete understanding of the code, many of these unimplemented codes add
vulnerability to the SDN network. Consequently, these software bugs remain unseen.
The attackers make use of these unseen software bugs to break into the network.
Unimplemented APIs are the major target of the attackers and our study shows some of
the attack scenarios. Identifying the unimplemented APIs of any controller and
implementing them before deploying the controller into the network is very important.
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TABLE IV. Unimplemented APIs of the floodlight controller
Module
Topology
Manager

API

Default
Return
void

handleMiscellaneo
usPeriodicEvents
transitionToStandb void
y

addOrUpdateSwitc void
h

Topology
instance

addOrUpdateTunn
elLink

void

isAllowed

true

inSameBroadcastD false
omain
getAllowedOutgoi null
ngBroadcastPort

getAllowedIncomi
ngBroadcastPort

null

Device
Manager

isEntityAllowed

true

Forwardi
ng

getModuleServices null

Link
Discover
y

getServiceImpls

null

isTunnelPort

false

isLinkAllowed

True

Description
Ideally it should add periodic events
required by the topology but doesn’t
Ideally it should send the notification if
the controller's initial role was ACTIVE
and the controller is now transitioning to
STANDBY but doesn’t
Ideally it should update the concerning
switch disconnect and port down should
not be processed but doesn’t
It is called in add or update methods of the
link handling operation; however, this API
ignores the tunnel links
Always returns true rather than validating
the topology changes
Irrespective of checking if it has the same
broadcast domain, it returns false
Does not return null if the input dst is not
allowed by the higher-level topology. This
method should provide the topologically
equivalent broadcast port.
Does not return null if the input src
broadcast domain port is not allowed for
incoming broadcast. This method should
provide the topologically equivalent
incoming broadcast-allowed.
Returns true in either case rather than
validating device entity migration in the
OpenFlow network
Returns null rather than returning the list
of interfaces that this module implements.
Returns null rather than instantiating (as
needed) and returning objects that
implement each of the services exported
by this module.
Does not perform any validation for the
Tunnel Port
Always returns true rather than validating
the link attachment point in the OpenFlow
network
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We identified the important unimplemented APIs of the Floodlight controller and
predicted the potential misuse scenarios for these APIs. Table IV shows the list of some
important unimplemented Floodlight controller APIs and the description of the
corresponding APIs.
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Chapter 9: Validating Defense for Attack Scenarios
AEGIS protects the controller APIs from being misused. The key feature of AEGIS
implementation is that the controller API’s code remains the same and the applications
call the existing controller API. However, since the controller APIs are hooked by
AEGIS, instead of the controller API, the hooked APIs are called. Inside the API hook,
the policy engine executes and validates the API usage. Thus, validating the defense for
the attack scenarios involves applying policies to the misused APIs and executing the
SDN controller with AEGIS implementation. AEGIS and new policies for the controller
APIs helps to validate the API usage and detect any misuse scenario. Rerunning the
attack scenarios with AEGIS implementation on the Floodlight controller shows that
AEGIS successfully prevent API misuse when the network is attacked or applications try
to perform outbreaks on the controller.

9.1 Preventing System Crash Scenario
In our attack scenario, the controller shuts down after the topology manager
advertently calls System.exit() API. We defined access policy for System.exit() API as:
, write, null,
which states that, an access policy “A” is defined for the System.exit() API and the
“Main” module is the only allowed caller of this API and it has “write” permission for
access to this API. And, there are no (null) input or output parameters that are validated
for this API.
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Due to the unsuccessful execution of the policy, this access will be blocked by
AEGIS, and as shown in Figure 16, the controller continues to execute as anticipated.
However, in the case of lawful controller termination such as failure in a binding
controller to the designated IP address and port, this API is triggered by the main module
and the controller shuts down, as shown in the Figure 17.

Fig. 16. Controller continues to run although the topology manager calls Exit() API

Fig. 17. Main module is allowed to call Exit() API.
9.2 Detecting and Preventing Backdoor Attack
In the case of a backdoor attack, the attacker generates spoofed ICMP packets. The
attacker then targets two different hosts in the network to send ICMP requests using an
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impersonated source as a compromised host’s IP address and MAC, and destination as a
victim host. To detect and prevent this attack scenario, it is important to detect the
spoofed packets. The Floodlight controller’s device manager module creates device
entities database entries based upon MAC addresses seen in the network and tracks
network addresses mapped to the device and their location within the network. The
device manager’s getSourceEntityFromPacket method retrieves device entity information
from the packet. Based on this, the learnDeviceByEntity method does a lookup in the
device entity database of the device manager module. The lookup is based on a device
key, which is created using the host’s MAC address. However, for a spoofed ICMP
request with a wrong MAC address, this lookup matches an existing entity.
Implementation of AEGIS policies protects this API and shows results, wherein it
additionally checks for the host’s attachment point on the switch port while performing a
lookup for the device entity.
The defined policy for the learnDeviceByEntity() API is
, null,
,
which states that a syntactic policy, “Y,” is defined for the learnDeviceByEntity()
API with condition check as “entity’s switch port does not belong to the existing device
entity in the entity database.” There is no (null) permission set defined for this API
access; that means no validation is being done for the caller. An input parameter “entity”
and an output parameter “device” are validated for this API.

68

With this policy validation, when a spoofed packet is received by the switch, the
switch forwards this packet to the controller as there is no flow rule entry which matches
the received packet. The controller considers this as a new device in the network and
tries to match it with the existing entity database. In the absence of this policy it will
match the device with an existing entry, as it does not take the switch port into the
consideration. However, with this policy it will try to match the switch port along with
the entity but will fail.
In this case, the API will be invoked and output is set to null if validation fails.
Figure 18 shows that the controller has detected spoofed ICMP messages which are then
blocked. Thus, AEGIS implementation successfully defended a backdoor attack.

Spoofed ICMP Request

Fig. 18. Validation for Backdoor attack.

9.3 Preventing Host Location Hijacking Attack
In this attack scenario, the attacker hijacks some of the host’s location information in
the network to give the impression that the host has been moved. Thus, the controller
redirects the packets meant for the legitimate hosts to the attacker. The attacker exploits
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the unimplemented isEntityAllowed API of the Floodlight controller. This API accepts
every update instead of blocking possible spoofing attacks.
The defined policy for boolean isEntityAllowed(Entity entity, IEntityClass
entityClass) API is:

, null,

,

which states that a syntactic policy, “Y,” is defined for the boolean isEntityAllowed
(Entity entity, IEntityClass entityClass) API with a condition check as “the entity’s
switch port does not belong to the existing device entity in the entity database.” A
communication policy “C” is defined with a check on “whether the entity’s switch port
did a valid shutdown before migration.” No (null) permission set is defined for API’s
access, which means no validation is being done for the caller. An input parameter
“entity” and an output parameter “boolean” are validated for this API.
When the attacker generates spoofed packets without physically changing the
location, the controller will detect this behavior. Inside the API hook, AEGIS returns
failure response for this API when such an attack is detected. The controller does not
update the host’s location information for the attacker, hence preventing possible
hijacking of the legitimate host. Figure 19 shows that AEGIS is able to detect the
malicious host migration and prevent the host location hijacking attack.
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Detecting malicious Host Migration on the switch port

Fig. 19. AEGIS detects host migration on the switch port
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Chapter 10: Discussion
The controller modules which are responsible for making forwarding, host tracking,
switching, managing topology and statistics related decisions are at the heart of the
controller and play a major role in the controller architecture. Our aim is to protect these
controller core module APIs which are being used by various north-bound and southbound interfaces and other controller modules. AEGIS defines the policy for accessing
these APIs, thus protecting the controller from application bugs and network attacks.

10.1 Related Work
Several approaches have been proposed to protect the controller from application
bugs and exploitation cases. The Rosemary controller implements a network application
containment and resilience strategy and runs applications in a containerized environment,
thereby having control over the application’s use of controller modules [13]. However, it
needs the applications and controller code to be refactored so as to accommodate
container implementation. We address this critical issue by implementing the API
hooking technique, which does not need changes in the original application or controller
code. We also selected critical attacks generated by the Rosemary researchers in our
experiments and demonstrated that prevention of such attacks is much easier with AEGIS
implementation.
TopoGuard identified a few of the unimplemented APIs of the controller code and
generated new attack scenarios such as host location hijacking attack [11]. However, the
TopoGuard implementation does not address a way to protect the controller from
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misusing other unimplemented APIs. This thesis identified other unimplemented APIs
which showed that defining simple policies will protect the controller from other API
misuse scenarios. The implementation includes a defense mechanism using a policy
engine to protect the controller from a host location hijacking attack.
An access control and policy-based scheme for the SDN controller may help in
securing the northbound APIs [12]. In particular, a controller needs to be protected from
network attacks. This study focused on protecting the controller core modules from
application as well as network attacks. This unique approach can be used for protecting
controller northbound and southbound interfaces as well.
When multiple applications are deployed in the SDN network, they could create
conflicting flow rules [28]. An SE-Floodlight implementation with various security
features includes solution for the conflicting flow rules. We presented a generic approach
to solve such issues of the controller security. A set of policies can be applied to resolve
many such security threats.

10.2 Performance Comparison
AEGIS implementation on Floodlight controller involves adding new AspectJ
library and runtime weaving of the controller APIs. To determine the effectiveness of
this implementation, it is important to perform AEGIS performance comparison tests for
memory usage, API execution time and boot-up time against existing Floodlight
controller. These tests are discussed below.
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10.2.1 Boot-up Time Comparison
AEGIS loads policies at the boot of the controller and starts the API hooks and
policy executor. Hence, it is important to measure performance impact at the controller
boot-up. Under the test environment, we measured boot-up time for the Floodlight
controller with and without AEGIS implementation for various numbers of policies. The
timer starts when the controller enters the main() function and ends when it loads all the
modules including AEGIS module and runs the REST APIs.

Boot-up time vs number of policies
Boot-up time (ms)

2500
2000
1500
AEGIS

1000

Floodlight
500
0
0 1 3 4 6 7 9 10 12 13 15 16 18 19 21 22 24 25 27 28 30 31 33 34 36 37 39 40 42

Number of policies
Fig. 20. Boot-up time performance analysis for AEGIS implementation

This analysis is done for an average of boot-up time for the fixed number of policies.
The boot-up time includes additional time required for reading the policy database,
interpreting policies and starting an AEGIS execution instance. Figure 20 shows that
there is an overhead of 2 to 3 seconds for AEGIS to boot-up. This boot-up time increases

74

as we add more policies to AEGIS. However, the percentage increase in the boot-up time
is 2.5%. Also, such overhead is acceptable as boot-up time is trivial for the controller
performance and our implementation does not add much to it because we implemented a
hash map to look up the policies from the database. Storing policies involves O(n) time
complexity and thus performance remains almost parallel to Floodlight with a slight
increase in the number of policies.

10.2.2 API Execution Time Comparison
For verifying AEGIS average API execution overhead, we performed a
throughput test of the SDN controller with the help of a cbench [29] utility. cbench
creates a number of OpenFlow switches, connects to the controller, creates 1000 unique
source MACs per switch, and measures average throughput for the number of flow rules
installed per second. We targeted the learnDeviceByEntity API for which we
implemented AEGIS policies. This is invoked when a new host is attached to the
network and a packet_In event is received from the OpenFlow switch. The graph shown
in Figure 21 is for the average API execution time for this API on AEGIS
implementation and floodlight implementation. The comparison shows that there is a
significant increase in the average API execution time. This is because AspectJ
implementation for the API hook in Java adds considerable overhead to the API
execution. This overhead is proportional to the Floodlight controller’s API usage with
increasing number of switches. However, there are around 40 to 50 important APIs for
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which we need to implement AEGIS. This number is comparatively less than all APIs of
the controller. Thus such overhead will not add much to the controller’s performance.
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Fig. 21. Average API execution time comparison

10.2.3 Memory Usage Comparison
The controller loads all the modules’ jar files into the memory and for the
throughput test scenario with the cbench utility we see controller memory usage remains
constant. For AEGIS implementation, we added AspectJ libraries and the memory usage
comparison shows that these additional controller libraries add a negligible amount of
overhead to the controller’s memory usage. Figure 22 shows a comparison of AEGIS
implementation against the Floodlight controller.
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Memory Usage vs Number of Switches
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Fig. 22. Memory usage comparison

10.3 Additional Features
AEGIS technique not only helps in applying access policies and protecting the
controller from application misuse and network attacks, it can also be useful for
implementing various other features for the controller:

a) Profiling the controller APIs usage
We can design a profiling policy (which API is being used by what applications
and how many times) for the controller APIs, which will prevent one application from
over-utilizing the controller and avoid starvation for the other applications.
b) Providing more debug logs and info
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Inside the hook, AEGIS can collect more debug info and logs from both the
southbound and northbound APIs without modifying the core APIs. This can be used for
collecting more logs and information of the network.
c) Debugging the live network
Leveraging the concept of API hooking, AEGIS can implement a live debugger for
the controller, which will debug the controller when it is live in the network.

However, this technique can be applied to any other northbound or southbound
interface or module.
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Chapter 11: Conclusion and Future Work
This thesis proposes a generation of network and application attack scenarios with a
major focus on misusing the SDN controller APIs. It then systematically investigates the
solution space and presents AEGIS, which uses a unique technique of automatically
taking charge of the controller APIs at runtime and validating their usage for the
applications and other controller modules. The policy engine and the hooked APIs
perform dynamic validation of the API parameters. These hooks can be controlled at
runtime and configured using AEGIS. Experimental results show that AEGIS is able to
prevent network attacks and inadvertent use of the controller APIs by the network
applications. It not only validates and prevents the controller API from being misused,
but it also helps to define standard policy language, which will help in preventing any
future attack scenarios.
However, this implementation requires manually creating the policy rules inside the
policy database. This process can be automated using static analysis of the controller
code to extract APIs and their parameters. The future work will focus on implementing
static analysis of the controller code to extract controller APIs. Also, AEGIS
implementation can be extended to other leading SDN controllers. The prototype AEGIS
implementation is able to prevent a few API misuse cases; however, future work would
focus on implementing AEGIS for all the important controller APIs. We hope that this
work will attract more attention from security researchers and we look forward to the
specifications being standardized with more consideration for SDN security.
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APPENDIX A
List of permission set for the OpenDaylight controller applications. This permission
set is based on our analysis of OpenDaylight controller applications. However, this
might change based on the application version and network administrators requirement.

TABLE V. Permission set for OpenDaylight controller
FLO
Topolo
ODL
Switch
W
OVSD HostT Statisti
gy
Applicati
Mana
Entri
B
racker
cs
Manag
on
ger
es
er

Read, Read,
Reservati
Write, Write,
on
Delete Delete

Group
Based
Policy
(GBP)

Read

Read,
Read,
Write,
Write
Delete

Read

Network
Intent Read,
Read,
Composi Write,
Write
Delete
tion
(NIC)

Read

Description

This project is meant to
provide dynamic low level
resource reservation so that
Read, Read,
users can get network as a
Read Write, Write,
service, connectivity or a
Delete Delete
pool of resources (ports,
bandwidth) for a specific
period of time.
The OpenDaylight Group
Based Policy project
Read,
Read,
defines and implements an
Write
intent system model.
Process. Automation.
Network Intent
Composition project will
enable the controller to
manage and direct network
Read
services and network
resources based on
describing the Intent for
network behaviors and
network policies
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TABLE V. Permission set for OpenDaylight controller
FLO
Topolo
ODL
Switch
W
OVSD HostT Statisti
gy
Applicati
Mana
Entri
B
racker
cs
Manag
on
ger
es
er

Service
Read,
Read,
Function
Write,
Write
Chaining
Delete
(SFC)

-

Read

-

-

Virtual
Read,
Read,
Tenant
Write,
Write
Network
Delete
(VTN)

Read

Read

-

-

Description
Service Function Chaining
provides the ability to
define an ordered list of a
network services (e.g.
firewalls, load balancers).
These service are then
"stitched" together in the
network to create a service
chain. This project provides
the infrastructure (chaining
logic, APIs) needed for
ODL to provision a service
chain in the network and an
end-user application for
defining such chains.
OpenDaylight VTN
provides multi-tenant
virtual network functions
on
OpenDaylight controller.
OpenDaylight VTN
consists of two parts:
VTN coordinator and VTN
manager.
VTN Coordinator
orchestrates multiple
OpenDaylight controllers,
and provides
applications with VTN
API.
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TABLE V. Permission set for OpenDaylight controller
FLO
Topolo
ODL
Switch
W
OVSD HostT Statisti
gy
Applicati
Mana
Entri
B
racker
cs
Manag
on
ger
es
er

IoTDM

Read

-

VPN

Read,
Write

Read

-

Device
Identific
ation and
Read,
Driver
Write
Manage
ment
(DIDM)

Read

Read

Read

Read

-

-

Read

-

-
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-

-

Description
The IoTDM project is
about developing a datacentric middleware that will
act as a oneM2M compliant
IoT Data Broker (IOTDM)
and enable authorized
applications to retrieve IoT
data uploaded by any
device.
This project will implement
the infrastructure services
required to support L3 VPN
service
This project addresses the
need to provide device
specific functionality.
Device specific
functionality is code that
performs a “feature”, and
the code is knowledgeable
of the capability and
limitations of the device.

APPENDIX B
Pseudo code for AEGIS Implementation
1: procedure ISPOLICYSET (api, policy)
2:

policylist

check policy is defined for this api

policydatabase(api)

3:
if policylist
policy then
4:
5:
return true
6:
else
7:
return false
8:
end if
9: end procedure
10:
11: procedure AEGIS(obj, …)
12:

return true if this policy is defined
for this api

input obj is an object of the
hooked api’s class

13:

api

get api name of this hook

14:

caller

get caller of this api

15:

permissionset

16:
17:
18:
19:

if caller.permissionset
permissionset then
proceed to next steps
end if
if ISPOLICYSET(api, accesspolicy) then

get permission set for this api

20:

allowedmodules

get allowed modules

21:

for module

allowedmodules do

22:
23:
24:
25:
26:

if caller module then
proceed_flag = true
end if
end for
end if

27:
28:
29:
30:

if proceed_flag != true then
return
end if
if ISPOLICYSET(api, semantic) then

31:

params

32:

for input

get object parameters
do
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check permission set

access policy

semantic policy

33:
34:
35:
36:
37:
38:
39:
40:
41:
42:

compute semantic policy for each input
end for
end if
if ISPOLICYSET(api, syntactic) then
params
get object parameters
for input

do

compute syntactic policy for each input
end for
end if
if ISPOLICYSET(api, communication) then

43:

params

44:

for input

45:
46:
47:
48:
49:
50:

syntactic policy

communication policy

get object parameters
do

compute communication policy for each input
end for
end if
if validation success then
returnobj = proceed ( api)
if ISEXITPOLICY(api) then

51:
execute exit policies
52:
end if
53: end if
54: return returnobj
55: end procedure

87

proceed api execution

